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NOTE 
A PROPOSAL FOR SETTLING THE INTERPRETATION OF 
FLORIDA’S PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT 
Lauren Rehm

 
Abstract 
Although created to encourage settlement, few rules have generated 
more collateral litigation than Florida’s proposals for settlement 
provisions. While Florida Statutes section 768.79 creates a substantive 
right to attorney’s fees, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 provides 
a procedural enforcement mechanism. However, through its 
unprecedented application of strict construction to a rule of civil 
procedure, the Florida Supreme Court has arguably made it more 
difficult to accomplish settlement by adding new requirements for valid 
proposals. Thus, with collateral litigation looming over proposals for 
settlement, burdening court dockets, and costing parties additional time 
and expense, now is the time to realign the court’s interpretation of Rule 
1.442 with the legislature’s intent to facilitate settlements. 
This Note specifically addresses the recent demise of joint proposals 
for settlement. Part I examines the history of Florida’s proposal for 
settlement provisions. An overview of recent court decisions regarding 
joint proposals highlights the implausibility that any joint proposal 
could satisfy the rigid requirements demanded by the Florida Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Rule 1.442. Part II explores how strict 
construction of Rule 1.442 is at odds with the court’s own interpretive 
principles for rules of civil procedure. Because this unprecedented strict 
judicial interpretation of a rule of civil procedure tends to blur the 
distinction between substantive law and procedural mechanisms, Part III 
discusses potential constitutional separation of powers implications. 
Finally, Part IV offers a comparative analysis of Nevada’s proposal for 
settlement statute and court rule to propose a framework for change in 
Florida.  
In conclusion, this Note suggests that the court’s reliance on strict 
construction of a rule of civil procedure undermines the plain language 
and intent of Florida Statutes section 768.79. The court would better 
serve the purpose of proposals for settlement by adhering to the 
principle that procedural rules are to be construed for the equitable and 
just application of the substantive law. 
                                                                                                                     
  J.D. expected, May 2013, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I am blessed to 
have an amazing family who encourages me every step of the way. I could not be more grateful 
for their constant love and support. Thank you to the members and staff of the Florida Law 
Review for their dedication during the editing and publication process. A special thank you to 
Professor Amy Mashburn for her invaluable insights.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the confusion surrounding proposals for settlement, this 
much is certain: The road to hell is paved with good intentions. 
Although created to encourage settlement,
1
 “‘proposals for settlement’ 
have become the plague of Florida’s civil justice system”2 as they 
continue to spawn burdensome collateral litigation.
3
 Few rules have 
generated more unintended consequences than those created by the 
implementation of Florida Statutes section 768.79 and Florida Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1.442.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646, 650 (Fla. 2010) 
(explaining that the expected result of proposals for settlement “was to reduce litigation costs 
and conserve judicial resources by encouraging the settlement of legal actions”); United Servs. 
Auto Ass’n v. Behar, 752 So. 2d 663, 664 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the purpose 
of proposals for settlement “is to encourage the resolution of litigation”). 
 2. Mark Roman Law Grp., Formal Settlement Offers in Florida: A Hopeless Debacle for 
the Civil Justice System, ROMAN GAYNOR SCALES OF JUSTICE, http://www.clearwatercaraccidentlaw 
yerblog.com/?p=142 (last visited Sept. 16, 2012). 
 3. See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 650 (stating that the effect of proposals for settlement “has 
been in sharp contrast to the intended outcome because the statute and rule have seemingly 
increased litigation as parties dispute the respective validity and enforceability of these offers”). 
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 6 [2012], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss6/8
2012] SETTLING THE INTERPRETATION OF FLORIDA’S PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT 1813 
 
Section 768.79 of Florida Statutes
4
 is Florida’s offer of judgment 
statute. This provision creates a statutory entitlement to attorney’s fees 
and court costs in civil actions when a party fails to timely accept a 
settlement offer and specific criteria are met.
5
 While the statute creates 
the substantive right, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 purports to 
track the statutory language to provide a procedural enforcement 
mechanism.
6
 However, Rule 1.442 (which refers to offers of judgment 
as “proposals for settlement”) seems to go beyond creating pertinent 
procedures by adding new requirements for valid proposals for 
settlement. For instance, one of the most litigated areas of proposals for 
settlement is joint proposals
7—an area which Florida Statutes section 
768.79 does not explicitly address. Despite the fact that the legislature 
did not hinder such proposals, courts interpreting Rule 1.442 have 
struck down many joint proposals as defective.
8
 For reasons such as 
this, “Rule 1.442 continues to be the most litigated of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure notwithstanding its intended purpose of reducing litigation by 
encouraging settlements.”9 
As the unintended consequences of proposals for settlement continue 
to plague Florida courts, there is an increasing concern over “whether 
either [Rule 1.442] or [Florida Statutes section 768.79] is fulfilling its 
intended purpose of encouraging settlement or at times is having the 
opposite effect of increasing litigation.”10 In its recent 2010 decision 
Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka,11 the Florida Supreme 
Court alluded to this concern regarding the effectiveness of the 
provisions by quoting the lament of Florida’s Fourth District Court of 
Appeal: “We regret that this case is just one more example of the offer 
of judgment statute causing a proliferation of litigation, rather than 
                                                                                                                     
 4. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (2011). 
 5. See id. § 768.79(1). 
 6. Saenz v. Campos, 967 So. 2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007); see also 
Adams v. Wright, 403 So. 2d 391, 393–94 (Fla. 1981) (distinguishing substance, which is the 
domain of the legislature, and procedure, which is the domain of the courts, by stating that 
procedure “encompass[es] the course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process or 
steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or obtains redress for their invasion. ‘Practice 
and procedure’ may be described as the machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the 
product thereof.”). 
 7. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(c)(3) (establishing that “[a] proposal may be made by or to 
any party or parties and by or to any combination of parties properly identified in the proposal”); 
Raymond L. Robin, What Is Left of the Joint Proposal for Settlement?, 85 FLA. B.J. 16, 17 
(2011) (defining a joint proposal for settlement as “a single proposal made to or from multiple 
parties”). 
 8. See Robin, supra note 7, at 22.  
 9. BRUCE J. BERMAN, BERMAN’S FLORIDA CIVIL PROCEDURE 728 (2010–2011 ed.). 
 10. Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 223, 227 (Fla. 2007) (Pariente, J., specially 
concurring). 
 11. 36 So. 3d 646 (Fla. 2010). 
3
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fostering its primary goal to terminate all claims, end disputes, and 
obviate the need for further intervention of the judicial process.”12  
Although many issues surrounding proposals for settlement have 
been recognized as ripe for review,
13
 this Note specifically addresses the 
recent demise of the joint proposal for settlement. The demise of this 
useful tool for ending disputes undermines the legislative intent behind 
proposals for settlement. There are two different avenues toward 
correcting this problem, and both avenues should be considered. First, 
the Florida Supreme Court can adapt its current interpretation of 
Rule 1.442 to better facilitate the purpose of encouraging settlement. 
Second, the Florida Legislature can amend Florida Statutes section 
768.79 to specifically address joint proposals for settlement. This Note 
will pursue the first avenue, proposing that the most pragmatic means of 
reviving the joint proposal as an effective tool for settlement lie in the 
hands of the court.  
Perhaps due to the Florida Supreme Court’s current strict 
construction of Rule 1.442, the continuing trend is “that Florida courts, 
more likely than not, strike down Proposals for Settlement when the 
issue goes on appeal.”14 Thus, the good intentions of encouraging 
settlement are seemingly forgotten. With collateral litigation looming 
over proposals for settlement, burdening court dockets, and costing 
parties additional time and expense, appellate courts have articulated the 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Id. at 650 (quoting  Sec. Professionals, Inc. v. Segall, 685 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 13. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Se. Floating Docks, Inc., 632 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2011). 
The Eleventh Circuit Court recently certified three questions to the Florida Supreme Court for 
clarification: 
First, we inquire whether an offer of judgment may be viable when filed under 
the following circumstances: the offer was filed by a defendant after a jury 
verdict for the defendant had been set aside by the district court’s grant of a 
new trial, and after the new trial date had been scheduled, but more than 45 
days before the scheduled retrial; and the defendant ultimately prevailed 
because the appellate court reversed the grant of a new trial and reinstated the 
initial verdict. Second, we ask whether the term “joint proposal” in Rule 
1.442(c)(3) applies to cases where acceptance of the offer is conditioned upon 
dismissal with prejudice of an offeree’s claims against an offeror and a third 
party. Finally, we seek a determination of whether the Florida offer of 
judgment statute applies to actions filed in Florida, in which there exists a 
contractually agreed upon choice-of-law clause providing for the application of 
the substantive law of another state. We certify these questions because we are 
unable to find definitive answers in clearly established Florida law, either case 
law or statutory. 
Id. at 1197. 
 14. Christopher B. Hopkins, Another Joint Proposal for Settlement Voided in 
Florida . . . Concurrence Asks for Legislative Intervention, FLA. L. COMMENT. (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://www.floridalawcommentary.com/category/proposals-for-settlements. 
4
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need for the Florida Supreme Court “to consider whether [R]ule 1.442 
should be amended to align with the legislative intent that offers of 
judgments . . . are meant to encourage settlements.”15 
Part I of this Note examines the history of Florida’s proposals for 
settlement provisions. An overview of recent court decisions regarding 
joint proposals highlights the implausibility that any joint proposal 
could satisfy the rigid requirements demanded by the Florida Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Rule 1.442. Part II explores how strict 
construction of Rule 1.442 is at odds with the court’s own interpretive 
principles for rules of civil procedure despite the reasons the court has 
offered to justify an exception. Because this unprecedented strict 
judicial interpretation of a rule of civil procedure tends to blur the 
distinction between substantive law and procedural mechanisms, Part III 
discusses potential constitutional separation of powers implications. 
Finally, Part IV offers a comparative analysis of Nevada’s proposal for 
settlement statute and court rule to propose a framework for change in 
Florida.  
In conclusion, this Note suggests that the Florida Supreme Court’s 
strict construction of a rule of civil procedure undermines the plain 
language and intent of Florida Statutes section 768.79—the statute that 
Rule 1.442 is meant to implement. Rather than interpreting Rule 1.442 
to require unyielding inflexibility, the court would better serve the 
purpose of proposals for settlement by adhering to the well-established 
interpretive principle that procedural rules are to be construed for the 
equitable and just application of the substantive law. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS 
A.  An Overview of Florida Statutes Section 768.79 
In order to craft an enforceable proposal for settlement, Florida 
Statutes section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 must 
be read alongside one another.
16
 At the outset of this historical 
overview, it is important to note the distinction between a statute and a 
court rule. Substantive law is created by statutes; “statutes are 
manufactured by a constitutionally authorized legislative body, and are 
directed towards those who are constitutionally obligated to implement, 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Cano v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 8 So. 3d 408, 411 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) 
(Hazouri, J., concurring specially). 
 16. See, e.g., V. Julia Luyster & Jennifer Lodge, When Is a Joint Proposal for Settlement 
a Valid Proposal for Settlement: Apportionment, Avoiding Ambiguity in Release Language, and 
the Barnes Dilemma, 24 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 12, 12 (2005) (explaining that “[d]rafting a valid and 
enforceable joint proposal for settlement requires strict adherence to § 768.79, Florida Statutes 
and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442”). See generally Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer 
Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003). 
5
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enforce, or follow the law.”17 In order to provide a mechanism for 
enforcing the substantive law created by statutes, “courts possess an 
inherent power to regulate proceedings and facilitate the administration 
of justice by the promulgation of rules of practice.”18 
Florida Statutes section 768.79 establishes the substantive law for 
proposals for settlement.
19
 The statute provides in relevant part: 
In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this 
state, if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not 
accepted by the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall 
be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees 
incurred by her or him or on the defendant's behalf 
pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other contract 
from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of 
no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at 
least 25 percent less than such offer, and the court shall set 
off such costs and attorney's fees against the award . . . . If 
a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not 
accepted by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff 
recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent 
greater than the offer, she or he shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred from the date 
of the filing of the demand.
20
  
In other words, the statute creates an “‘entitlement’ to fees”21 for a 
party who makes a proposal for settlement that is not accepted within 
thirty days, and the proposal is ultimately 25% greater than or less than 
the resulting court judgment depending on the party. After these basic 
criteria are satisfied, the statute “provides four requirements that an 
offer must fulfill in order to be used as the basis for an award of 
attorney’s fees and costs.”22 First, the offer must be in writing and 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretative Lessons from Positive 
Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 958–59 (2007). 
 18. Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of 
Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 624 (1957). In Florida, this power of the courts is 
rooted in the Florida Constitution, which states that “the supreme court shall adopt rules for the 
practice and procedure.” FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2.  
 19. The Florida Legislature enacted a companion statute, Florida Statutes section 45.061, 
in 1987. However, due to the confusion caused by three provisions (two statutes and one court 
rule) simultaneously governing proposals for settlement, a 1990 amendment to Florida Statutes 
section 768.7 incorporated various provisions of Florida Statutes section 45.061. After this 
consolidation, the legislature effectively repealed Florida Statutes section 45.061. FLA. STAT. 
§ 45.061(6). 
 20. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(1) (2011). 
 21. Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 22. Katherine H. Miller, Note, A History of Apportioning Joint Offers of Judgment in 
6
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reference Florida Statutes section 768.79.
23
 Second, the offer must 
specify the names of the offeror and the offeree.
24
 Third, the offer must 
“state with particularity the amount offered to settle a claim for punitive 
damages, if any.”25 Fourth, the offer must “state its total amount.”26 
Attorney’s fees and court costs should be awarded if the offer satisfies 
these four requirements.
27
 However, even if a party is entitled to fees 
under the statute, the court has discretion to reject an award if it 
“determine[s] that an offer was not made in good faith.”28 Finally, the 
statute specifies six criteria the court must consider in determining the 
reasonableness of an attorney’s fees award.29  
Although shifting attorney’s fees and court costs may arguably 
penalize a party who rejects a proposal and fails to terminate 
litigation,
30
 a proposal for settlement “is intended to be used as a tool to 
encourage settlement not a tool of intimidation.”31 In fact, the Florida 
Legislature enacted the statute in 1986 for the purpose of 
“encourag[ing] parties to settle . . . without going to trial.”32 Thus, the 
                                                                                                                     
Florida: Is Willis Shaw Really the Bottom Line, or  Is There an Exception?, 28 NOVA L. REV. 
841, 845 (2004). 
 23. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(2)(a) (2011). 
 24. Id. § 768.79(2)(b). 
 25. Id. § 768.79(2)(c). 
 26. Id. § 768.79(2)(d). 
 27. See Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (stating 
that “the legislature has created a mandatory right to attorney’s fees, if the statutory 
prerequisites have been met”). 
 28. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(7)(a) (2011); see also Sharaby v. KLV Gems Co., Inc., 45 So. 3d 
560, 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that “the good faith requirement ‘insists that 
the offeror have some reasonable foundation on which to base an offer’”) (quoting Schmidt, 629 
So. 2d at 1039). 
 29. See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(7)(b). The court must consider the following factors:  
(1) The then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim. 
(2) The number and nature of offers made by the parties. 
(3) The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue. 
(4) Whether the person making the offer had unreasonably refused to furnish 
information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of such offer. 
(5) Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions of far-
reaching importance affecting nonparties. 
(6) The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the person making 
the offer reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be 
prolonged. 
Id.  
 30. See Abbott & Purdy Grp. Inc. v. Bell, 738 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
1999). 
 31. Kaufman v. Smith, 693 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 32. Aspen v. Bayless, 564 So. 2d 1081, 1083 (Fla. 1990); see also Pirelli Armstrong Tire 
Corp. v. Jensen, 752 So. 2d 1275, 1278 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (summarizing that the staff 
analysis prepared by the Florida House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary for House 
7
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statute aims to persuade parties not to pursue litigation but rather to 
avoid costs, attorney’s fees, and extensive time by settling.33 
B.  An Overview of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 
While Florida Statutes section 768.79 provides the substantive law 
for proposals for settlement, “rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil 
Procedure presents the means of properly applying the statute.”34 Rule 
1.442 was adopted in 1972
35
 for the same purpose as the statute—“to 
terminate all claims, end disputes, and obviate the need for further 
intervention of the judicial process.”36 However, because of the rule’s 
many discrepancies with the requirements of the statute, Rule 1.442 
actually adds to the need for judicial intervention.
37
 The long history of 
uncertainty resulting from the interplay between Rule 1.442 and Florida 
Statutes section 768.79 was characterized by one judge as “one of the 
most oblique areas of rule and law that I think I have ever seen.”38 Thus, 
rather than attempting to fully chronicle each amendment and its 
impact, this Section provides an overview of the most significant 
developments in Rule 1.442.   
Rule 1.442 was initially modeled after Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 68,
39
 “the only federal rule devoted exclusively to 
encouraging settlement.”40 In its original form, Rule 1.442 was exactly 
the same as Federal Rule 68,
41
 which is an asymmetric cost-shifting 
                                                                                                                     
Bill 321 indicates the purpose of the bill was to “encourage settlement of civil cases which 
could, in turn, result in lower litigation costs. Similarly, the Senate Staff Analysis and Economic 
Impact Statement prepared for Senate Bill 866 indicates the bill’s purpose was to expand the 
offer of judgment concept to encourage settlements between parties”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Nat’l Healthcorp Ltd. P’ship v. Close, 787 So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“The legislative purpose of section 768.79 is to encourage the early settlement and termination 
of litigation in civil cases generally.”). 
 33. See Miller, supra note 22, at 843. 
 34. Id.; see also Julie H. Littky-Rubin, Proposals for Settlement: Minding Your P’s and 
Q’s Under Rule 1.442, 75 FLA. B.J. 12, 12 (2001) (explaining that Rule 1.442 “provides the 
mechanism to assert those rights [created by Florida Statutes section 786.79] and delineates the 
proper procedure necessary for implementing the substantive statute”). 
 35. In re the Fla. Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So. 2d 21, 40–41 (Fla. 1972).  
 36. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989). 
 37. See Miller, supra note 22, at 847 (stating that “rule 1.442 does not fulfill its intended 
purpose to alleviate the judicial system of its burdensome caseload; instead, it adds to it”).  
 38. Stouffer Hotel Co. v. Teachers Ins., 944 F. Supp. 874, 875 (M.D. Fla. 1995) 
(Merryday, J.). 
 39. Abbott & Purdy Grp. Inc. v. Bell, 738 So. 2d 1024, 1027 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
1999) (stating that the “former Rule 1.442 was adopted using Federal Rule 68 as a model”). 
 40. Clinton A. Wright III, Note, Confusion in Florida Offer of Judgment Practice: 
Resolving the Conflict Between Judicial and Legislative Enactments, 43 FLA. L. REV. 35, 37 
(1991). 
 41. In re the Fla. Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So. 2d 21, 41 (Fla. 1972). 
8
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mechanism available only to defending parties.
42
 Because Federal Rule 
68 only pertains to court costs and does not create an entitlement to 
attorney’s fees, a defending party has little incentive to attempt a 
settlement.
43
 Thus, Federal Rule 68 and its protégé have been largely 
ineffective in reducing litigation.
44
  
In 1989, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a new version of 
Rule 1.442.
45
 This new rule came in the wake of the legislature’s 
enactment of Florida Statutes section 768.79 and attempted to align 
Rule 1.442 with the two-way fee-shifting statute.
46
 However, despite 
good intentions, the adoption of the new rule failed to settle confusion 
over the proper procedural requirements for a proposal for settlement. 
The Florida Supreme Court attempted to alleviate this confusion in 
Timmons v. Combs.
47
 In Timmons, the court explicitly recognized that 
“the circumstances under which a party is entitled to costs and 
attorney’s fees is substantive and . . . rule [1.442] can only control 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68. The federal offer of judgment rule states: 
(a) Making an Offer; Judgment on an Accepted Offer. At least 14 days before 
the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an 
opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs 
then accrued. If, within 14 days after being served, the opposing party serves 
written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and notice 
of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter judgment. 
(b) Unaccepted Offer. An unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn, but it does 
not preclude a later offer. Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible 
except in a proceeding to determine costs. 
(c) Offer After Liability is Determined. When one party’s liability to another 
has been determined but the extent of liability remains to be determined by 
further proceedings, the party held liable may make an offer of judgment. It 
must be served within a reasonable time—but at least 14 days—before the date 
set for a hearing to determine the extent of liability. 
(d) Paying Costs After an Unaccepted Offer. If the judgment that the offeree 
finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must 
pay the costs incurred after the offer was made. 
Id. 
 43. See Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and 
the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1566 (2008) 
(observing that “the penalty for rejecting an offer is too small in most cases to be taken 
seriously”). 
 44. See id. (explaining that Federal Rule 68 “is written in a way that makes it an 
extremely poor tool for settlement promotion”); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, SURVEY OF 
STATE OFFER OF JUDGMENT PROVISIONS 1 (2004), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cf 
m?Section=Offers_of_Judgment&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=120 (referring 
to Federal Rule 68 as a “toothless provision”). 
 45. See Fla. Bar Re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, 550 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1989). 
 46. See Miller, supra note 22, at 847 (providing a brief historical overview of the 
amendments to Florida’s proposals for settlement provisions). 
 47. 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992). 
9
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procedural matters.”48 In an effort to reconcile troublesome distinctions 
between the provisions, the court repealed Rule 1.442 and adopted the 
procedural elements of Florida Statutes section 768.79.
49
 Ultimately, 
however, the new version of Rule 1.442 did little to eliminate the 
uncertainty surrounding proposals for settlement.  
C.  An Overview of Joint Proposals for Settlement 
Rule 1.442 was again amended in 1996.
50
 This time, the court 
adopted various requirements not specifically contemplated by the 
substantive statute.
51
 In particular, the court adopted subsection (c)(3), 
requiring apportionment for joint proposals.
52
 Although the 1996 
amendments “were designed to create a coherent framework for 
reconciling Florida’s offer of judgment law, and to end the proliferation 
of litigation sabotaging the statute’s goal of ending claims and 
disputes,” the amendments have not had that effect.53 In fact, the Florida 
Supreme Court lamented: 
Rule 1.442 was amended effective January 1, 1997, to set 
forth specific procedures for effectuating a valid offer of 
judgment, including the requirement that a joint offer of 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 2–3. 
 49. Id. at 3. 
 50. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442 cmt. n.1. 
 51. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(c). This section of the rule requires: 
(1) A proposal shall be in writing and shall identity the applicable Florida law 
under which it is being made. 
(2) A proposal shall: 
(A) name the party or parties making the proposal and the party or parties 
to whom the proposal is being made; 
(B) identify the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to resolve; 
(C) state with particularity any relevant conditions;  
(D) state the total amount of the proposal and state with particularity all 
nonmonetary terms of the proposal; 
(E) state with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for 
punitive damages, if any: 
(F) state whether the proposal includes attorneys’ fees and whether the 
attorneys’ fees are part of the legal claim; and 
(G) include a certificate of service in the form required by rule 1.080(f). 
(3) A proposal may be made by or to any party or parties and by or to any 
combination of parties properly identified in the proposal. A joint proposal 
shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party. 
Id.; cf. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(2) (2011) (requiring only that the offer (1) be in writing, (2) 
identify the parties, (3) state with particularity any amount offered to settle any punitive 
damages claim, and (4) state its total amount). 
 52. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(c)(3). 
 53. Littky-Rubin, supra note 34, at 12. 
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judgment state the amount and terms attributable to each 
party . . . . It was the Court’s hope that the . . . amendments 
to rule 1.442 would enable parties to focus with greater 
specificity in their negotiations and thereby facilitate more 
settlements and less litigation . . . . [S]ubdivision (c)(3) of 
rule 1.442 has instead caused a proliferation of litigation 
rather than obviate the need for further intervention of the 
judicial process.
54
 
Although Rule 1.442 now explicitly addresses joint proposals, “the 
Florida Supreme Court limited the use of joint proposals for settlement 
even before Rule 1.442(c)(3) became effective.”55 In Allstate Indemnity 
Co. v. Hingson,
56
 the court struck down as defective a joint proposal 
served by a single defendant to multiple plaintiffs because the proposal 
failed to apportion the amount each plaintiff would receive.
57
 Although 
Rule 1.442(c)(3) was not yet effective when the proposal was made, the 
court invalidated the proposal and held that Florida Statutes section 
768.79 requires “each party who receive[s] an offer of settlement is 
entitled . . . to evaluate the offer as it pertains to him or her.”58 The 
dissent disagreed with this reading of the statute, emphasizing that “[i]n 
fact, section 768.79(2)(d) merely provides that the offer of judgment 
must [s]tate its total amount.”59 However, the majority’s “strict 
approach to joint proposals for settlement has been followed ever 
since.”60 
After the adoption of Rule 1.442(c)(3), the Florida Supreme Court 
carried its strict approach even further in Lamb v. Matetzschk.
61
 In 
Lamb, the court mandated apportionment among parties in joint 
proposals for settlement “even when one party’s alleged liability is 
purely vicarious.”62 However, such a requirement “is most problematic 
because the liability of the defendants in [the vicarious liability] context 
is coextensive and therefore incapable of being realistically 
apportioned.”63 In a special concurrence, Justice Barbara Pariente 
cautioned the court that its rigid interpretation of Rule 1.442 may fail to 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906 So. 2d 1037, 1043 (Fla. 2005) (Pariente, J., specially 
concurring) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 55. Robin, supra note 7, at 17. 
 56. 808 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2002). 
 57. See id. at 199. 
 58. Id. (quoting C & S Chems., Inc. v. McDougald, 754 So. 2d 795, 797–98 (Fla. 2d Dist. 
Ct. App. 2000)). 
 59. Id. at 200 (Harding, J., dissenting) (quoting Bodek v. Gulliver Acad. Inc., 702 So. 2d 
1331, 1332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)). 
 60. Robin, supra note 7, at 18. 
 61. 906 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2005). 
 62. Id. at 1042. 
 63. Id. at 1045 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only).  
11
Rehm: A Proposal for Settling the Interpretation of Florida’s Proposals
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1822 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
“foster the primary goal of the rule and section 768.79 . . . which is to 
encourage settlements in order to eliminate trials if possible.”64  
Perhaps in recognition of the implausibility of the strict 
requirement it imposed in Lamb, the Florida Supreme Court 
amended Rule 1.442 in 2010.
65
 Although the apportionment 
requirement established by Rule 1.442(c)(3) is still problematic for 
many parties who attempt to settle disputes through joint 
proposals,
66
 Rule 1.442(c)(4) now carves out an exception to the 
apportionment requirement in the context of vicarious liability.
67
 In 
light of recent developments in the realm of joint proposals, 
specifically in regards to the issue of joint proposals conditioned on 
mutual acceptance, it may be time for the court to once again 
reconsider its strict approach. 
II.  THE DEMISE OF JOINT PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT 
Until relatively recently, collateral litigation surrounding joint 
proposals for settlement primary focused on issues of 
apportionment. It was not until 2008 that Florida appellate courts 
first faced “the issue of whether a joint proposal for settlement could be 
partially accepted; in other words, whether an offeree of a joint proposal 
for settlement could settle the case where others included in the joint 
proposal rejected it.”68 The certified conflict between the First District 
Court of Appeal in Clements v. Rose
69
 and the Second District Court 
of Appeal in Attorneys’ Title Fund, Inc. v. Gorka70 demonstrates how 
the Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision on this issue has weakened 
the utility of joint proposals. 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. at 1042–43 (Pariente, J., specially concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 65. See In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 52 So. 3d 579, 588 (Fla. 
2010).  
 66. See Luyster & Lodge, supra note 16, at 12 (“Although the purpose of compliance with 
the rule is to reduce or eliminate judicial intervention in the resolution of litigation, strict 
compliance may not always be possible or even plausible without judicial intervention.”). 
 67. See Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 52 So. 3d at 588. Florida Rule 
of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(4) states: 
Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(3), when a party is alleged to be solely 
vicariously, constructively, derivatively, or technically liable, whether by 
operation of law or by contract, a joint proposal made by or served on such a 
party need not state the apportionment or contribution as to that party. 
Acceptance by any party shall be without prejudice to rights of contribution or 
indemnity. 
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(c)(4). 
 68. Robin, supra note 7, at 20. 
 69. 982 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 70. 989 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
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In Clements v. Rose, the First District Court of Appeal confronted 
a joint proposal for settlement issued by a plaintiff dog bite victim to 
the two defendant dog owners.
71
 The proposal clearly apportioned 
the amount demanded from each defendant to settle the suit, and the 
proposal explicitly stated that it was conditioned on the acceptance 
of both defendants.
72
 Both defendants rejected the proposal, and the 
plaintiff later received a verdict 25% greater than the amount of the 
proposal.
73
 The trial court denied an award of attorney’s fees under 
the proposal for settlement provisions finding that the proposal 
failed to state with particularity any relevant conditions as required by 
Rule 1.442.
74
 In particular, the court found the proposal was ambiguous 
as to whether each defendant could independently accept the proposal.
75
 
The appellate court reversed, finding the proposal was not 
ambiguous under the plain language of Rule 1.442 because the 
proposal clearly stated that it was conditioned on joint acceptance.
76
 
Further, the court stated that “[a]lthough it is conditional, the offer is 
as definite as it is within [offeror’s] power to make, because the 
condition depends not on [the offeror’s] election, but on each [offeree’s] 
election.”77 In its reasoning, the appellate court emphasized that 
“Rule 1.442 is designed to facilitate settlements, not to render 
settlement of a case impossible where there are multiple defendants.”78  
In Attorneys’ Title Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, the Second District Court of 
Appeal confronted the same issue of whether a joint proposal 
conditioned on mutual acceptance is enforceable. In Gorka, a defendant 
insurance company offered to settle the claims brought against it by a 
married couple.
79
 In its proposal, the insurance company specified that 
it would pay $12,500 to the wife and $12,500 to the husband to fully 
settle all damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.80 The proposal was 
conditioned upon the offer being accepted by both spouses.
81
 Neither 
spouse accepted the proposal and the insurance company later prevailed 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See Clements, 982 So. 2d at 731.  
 72. See id. at 731–32. The proposal read: “TOTAL AMOUNT OF PROPOSAL: Seventy-
Five Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($75,000.00), payable to Plaintiff, JAMES CLEMENTS; 
(Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred and no/100 Dollars ($37,500.00) from Defendant, 
BOBBY B. ROSE, and Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred and no/100 Dollars ($37,500.00) 
from Defendant, MAUDEANNA ROSE).” Id. 
 73. Id. at 732. 
 74. Id. at 731–32. 
 75. Id. at 732. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. See Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 989 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2008). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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at trial.
82
 The appellate court upheld the denial of an award of attorney’s 
fees to the insurance company under the proposal for settlement 
provisions.
83
 Rather than emphasizing the purpose of Rule 1.442, as the 
court did in Clements,
84
 the Second District Court of Appeal repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of strictly interpreting the rule.
85
 The court 
invalidated the proposal because it did not allow both offerees to 
independently accept the offer.
86
    
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the district court conflict by 
accepting review in Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka.87 In 
a per curiam opinion, the supreme court upheld the Second District 
Court of Appeal’s decision that a proposal for settlement conditioned 
upon mutual acceptance renders that proposal invalid because “neither 
offeree can independently evaluate or settle his or her respective claim 
by accepting the proposal.”88 The court relied on Lamb v. Matetzschk,89 
stating that Lamb instructed that “an offer must be differentiated such 
that each party can unilaterally settle the action.”90 Despite the plain 
language of Rule 1.442(c)(3), which allows joint proposals so long as 
the amounts and terms attributed to each party are defined, the court 
found that joint proposals conditioned on mutual acceptance are 
defective because such proposals are “the antithesis of a differentiated 
offer.”91  
Justice Ricky Polston’s dissent, which is joined by two other 
justices, stressed the adverse consequences of the court’s strict position 
against joint proposals conditioned on mutual acceptance.
92
 The dissent 
urged that Gorka “effectively eliminates the ability to make joint 
offers.”93 By imposing a prohibition against joint proposals for 
settlement which is not found in the plain language of either the statute 
or the court rule,
94
 the court failed to further the legislature’s goal of 
                                                                                                                     
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1214. 
 84. Clements v. Rose, 982 So. 2d 731, 732 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that 
“Rule 1.442 is designed to facilitate settlements, not to render settlement of a case impossible 
where there are multiple defendants”). 
 85. See Gorka, 989 So. 2d at 1213 (stating that “the statute and rule are strictly construed 
in favor of the party against whom the penalty is sought”); id. at 1214 (reiterating the “penal 
nature of section 768.79 and the strict construction that we must apply”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. 36 So. 3d 646 (Fla. 2010). 
 88. Id. at 649. 
 89. 906 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2005). 
 90. Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 651. 
 91. Id.; see also Schantz v. Sekine, 60 So. 3d 444, 445–46 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
(summarizing the Gorka court’s analysis). 
 92. See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 652–54 (Polston, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. at 654; see also Schantz, 60 So. 3d at 446 (agreeing with the Gorka dissent). 
 94. See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 652 (Polston, J., dissenting) (“There is no prohibition against 
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encouraging settlement.
95
 Rather, the court minimized incentives to 
settle disputes by exposing parties to the risk of partial settlements.
96
 
The dissent explained that “a party is motivated to settle an entire case 
with all parties because the litigation is expensive, distracting, and 
unpleasant.”97 However, if a party cannot condition a proposal for 
settlement on the acceptance of all offerees, “then there may be little 
incentive to partially settle.”98 The defendant insurance company noted 
this concern in its appellate brief, stating: 
Creating a blanket rule that joint acceptance conditions 
make an offer invalid would run counter to the motivation 
of many offerors to bring a complete end to litigation 
. . . . Requiring parties to subject themselves to piecemeal 
settlements that neither end the case nor reduce the cost of 
litigation (or worse, fund the litigation against the offeror), 
would discourage offers and run counter to the purpose of 
the statute to encourage settlements.
99
 
Thus, “[t]he only way then to settle these cases is to make joint 
offers conditioned on all accepting . . . . This encourages settlement, 
consistent with the intent of the statute, and should be enforced by the 
Court as a valid condition of settlement.”100 
In addition to its damaging impact on the utility of joint proposals as 
tools for settlement, Gorka can also be criticized for its unsound 
reliance on Lamb. “Although Lamb had held that each offeree must be 
able to independently evaluate a proposal for settlement, no court had 
previously held that each must be able to independently accept the 
proposal.”101 This substantive right of independent control is noticeably 
absent from the plain language of the Florida Statutes section 768.79, 
which Rule 1.442 is meant to implement. The Gorka majority feared 
that without this independent control, an offeree who is willing to 
accept a proposal for settlement will be subject to court costs and 
attorney’s fees because of the decision of an unwilling offeree.102 
                                                                                                                     
offers to multiple parties conditioned on joint acceptance within rule 1.442 or section 768.79, 
Florida Statutes.”). 
 95. See id. (“Rule 1.442 implements section 768.79, which was enacted by the Legislature 
for the purpose of encouraging settlements.”). 
 96. Id. at 654. 
 97. Id. at 653. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Attorneys Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646 
(Fla. 2010) (No. 08-1899), 2009 WL 1387807 at *2 (internal citations omitted). 
 100. Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 654 (Polston, J., dissenting). 
 101. Robin, supra note 7, at 21. 
 102. See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 651 (“[A]n offeree who desires to avoid exposure to the fee 
sanction is restrained from doing so without the agreement of the other party and is therefore 
15
Rehm: A Proposal for Settling the Interpretation of Florida’s Proposals
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1826 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
However, the dissent noted that “a proper interpretation of how the rule 
and statute function” dispels this misplaced fear.103 Pursuant to Florida 
Statutes section 768.79(4)
104
 and Rule 1.442(f)(1),
105
 a joint offeree who 
wishes to settle would file a written notice of acceptance.
106
 Because the 
proposal specifies that it is explicitly conditioned on the acceptance of 
all offerees, the court would not have jurisdiction to enforce the 
agreement. However, Florida Statutes section 768.79(6)(a)
107
 ensures 
that the joint offeree who files notice of acceptance cannot be subject to 
attorney’s fees and court costs. On the other hand, the joint offeree who 
fails to file notice of acceptance is subject to attorney’s fees and court 
costs.
108
 
In the wake of Gorka, “litigants would be wise to avoid using the 
joint proposal for settlement because it is fraught with pitfalls and has 
been rendered obsolete by the case law.”109 The troubling demise of this 
popular tool for settlement may be rooted in the equally troubling 
judicial abandonment of established principles of interpretation for rules 
of civil procedure. 
A.  Strict Construction at Odds with the Court’s Interpretive Standard 
The Florida Supreme Court’s strict construction of a rule of civil 
procedure is puzzling in light of the court’s own interpretative standard 
for procedural rules. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.010 clearly sets 
forth that procedural rules are to be construed to further the goal of 
resolving litigation in a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” fashion.110 
Further, the commentary to Rule 1.010 provides: 
The direction that the rules “shall be construed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
                                                                                                                     
forced to participate in litigation that could have been settled. Consequently, the offeree lacks 
independent control over the decision to settle and conclude the litigation.”). 
 103. Id. at 653 (Polston, J., dissenting). 
 104. This section provides: “An offer shall be accepted by filing a written acceptance with 
the court within 30 days after service. Upon filing of both the offer and acceptance, the court has 
full jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.” FLA. STAT. § 768.79(4) (2012). 
 105. This rule states that a proposal may be “accepted by delivery of a written notice of 
acceptance within 30 days after service of the proposal.” FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(f)(1). 
 106. Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 653 (Polston, J., dissenting). 
 107. This section provides for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs only 
“[i]f a defendant serves an offer which is not accepted by the plaintiff, and if the judgment 
obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than the amount of the offer.” FLA. STAT. 
§ 768.79(6)(a) (2012). 
 108. See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 654 (Polston, J., dissenting) (“[I]f a plaintiff does not file the 
requisite notice of acceptance, then the plaintiff who has not accepted is subject to the terms of 
the costs recovery statute.”). 
 109. Robin, supra note 7, at 17. 
 110. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010. 
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every action” has two courses. It is, first, a direction that if 
a rule needs interpretation, the stated objective is the guide. 
The direction recognizes that procedural law is not an end 
in itself; it is only the means to an end. And that end is the 
proper administration of the substantive law. Procedural 
law fulfills its purpose if the substantive law is thereby 
administered in a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” 
manner . . . . 
It is, next, a direction that each rule shall be applied 
with that objective in mind, especially where the court may 
exercise a judicial discretion.
111
 
In other words, “the settled, formal principle within the rules 
themselves for interpreting the rules is not one of strict construction—or 
woodenly enforcing every failure to follow procedural rules—but 
instead an equitable guide of just application.”112 Like the substantive 
statute it is meant to enact, the stated objective of Rule 1.442 is “to 
terminate all claims, end disputes, and obviate the need for further 
intervention of the judicial process.”113 With that objective as a guide, 
the interpretive standard established in Rule 1.010 instructs courts to 
construe Rule 1.442 as a means to effect the “proper administration of 
the substantive law.”114 On the contrary, courts may interpret Rule 
1.442 as an “end in itself”115 by reading in additional requirements not 
found in the plain language of the proposal for settlement statute or 
court rule.
116
 Specifically, a judicially created requirement that 
proposals cannot be conditioned on mutual acceptance does not fulfill 
the purpose of the substantive law; rather, it discourages offerors from 
ending disputes by exposing them to the risk of piecemeal settlement.
117
  
It is also significant to note that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 
are generally modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 
therefore, federal case law may be considered in interpreting the 
purpose and operative effect of various rules.
118
 According to Professors 
                                                                                                                     
 111. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010 authors’ cmt.  
 112. Hauss v. Waxman, 914 So. 2d 474, 477 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (Farmer, J., 
concurring specially). 
 113. Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989). 
 114. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010 authors’ cmt. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Attorneys Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646, 652 (Fla. 2010) (Polston, 
J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “[t]here is no prohibition against offers to multiple parties 
conditioned on joint acceptance within rule 1.442 or section 768.79, Florida Statutes”).  
 117. See id. at 654 (Polston, J., dissenting) (stating that if an offeror cannot condition an 
offer on mutual acceptance “there may be little incentive to partially settle”). 
 118. See, e.g., Sheradsky v. Basadre, 452 So. 2d 599, 602 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); 
Brief and Appendix of Respondent at 14, Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2007) 
(No. 06-611), 2006 WL 2701071 at *14. 
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Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller in Federal Practice & 
Procedure:  
There is no place in the federal civil procedural system for 
the common law rule that statutes, and rules having the 
force of statutes, that are in derogation of the common law 
are to be strictly construed. Rule 1 requires the judge to 
construe the rules liberally to further the cause of justice. 
However, the judge must exercise this discretion soundly 
and with restraint because a construction that ignores the 
plain wording of a rule or fails to view it as part of the total 
procedural system ultimately may prove to be as 
detrimental to the system as an arbitrary or rigid 
construction and, in the end, not further the goal of the 
“just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action.”119 
In the face of this inconsistency, the Florida Supreme Court has 
pointed to the derogation of common law doctrine and the penal nature 
of proposals for settlement
120
 to justify its departure from its own 
established interpretive standard. However, these grounds fail to 
provide a solid justification for the court carving out an exception to its 
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” directive for a single rule of civil 
procedure. 
B.  Derogation of the Common Law Doctrine as Grounds for an 
Exception 
There is a longstanding tradition that statutes in derogation of the 
common law must be strictly construed.
121
 Florida Statutes section 
768.79 is in derogation of the common law because it creates an 
exception to the “American Rule,” which requires that “all litigants, 
even the prevailing one, must bear their own attorney’s fees.”122 The 
                                                                                                                     
 119. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1029 (3d ed. 2004). 
 120. See Willis Shaw Exp., Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003) 
(stating that Rule 1.442 should be strictly construed because the procedure is in derogation of 
the common law and is penal in nature). 
 121. See, e.g., Hauss v. Waxman, 914 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (Farmer, J., 
concurring specially) (providing a historical overview of the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions 
regarding the construction of statutes dating back to 1943); see also Jefferson B. Fordham & J. 
Russell Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 
438, 440–41 (1950) (tracing the historical origin of the derogation doctrine to English common 
law cases of the seventeenth century and perhaps earlier). 
 122. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also FLA. STAT. § 768.79(1) (2012); 
TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995) (“The Legislature has modified 
the American rule, in which each party pays its own attorney’s fees, and has created a 
18
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Florida Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he fundamental rule in Florida 
has been that an award of attorneys’ fees is in derogation of the 
common law and that statutes allowing for the award of such fees 
should be strictly construed.”123 It is important to bear in mind that “the 
court’s original basis for strict construction of attorney’s fees statutes 
was the ancient canon of statutory construction involving legislative 
changes in the common law.”124 Further, the court’s holdings did not 
contemplate strict construction for rules of civil procedure, but rather 
expressly referred to strict construction for statutory canons.
125
  
Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc.,
126
 a case decided in 
2003, was the first case to find that a rule of civil procedure should be 
strictly construed.
127
 Without explanation for its unprecedented 
expansion of strict construction,
128
 the Florida Supreme Court stated 
that strict construction applies “because the offer of judgment statute 
and rule are in derogation of the common law rule that each party pay 
its own fees.”129  
It makes little sense to carve out an exception to the well-established 
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” interpretive directive on the basis of the 
derogation of common law doctrine because a rule of civil procedure 
should not create substantive rights in derogation of any law.
130
 Rather, 
the rule should simply provide a procedural mechanism to enforce the 
statute.
131
 If Rule 1.442 is creating substantive rights in derogation of 
                                                                                                                     
substantive right to attorney’s fees in section 768.79 on the occurrence of certain specified 
conditions.”). 
 123. Roberts v. Carter, 350 So. 2d 78, 78–79 (Fla. 1977) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 124. Hauss, 914 So. 2d at 475 (Farmer, J., concurring specially). 
 125. See Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Williams, 85 So. 2d 619, 623 (Fla. 1956) (“[T]he award 
of attorneys fees is in derogation of common law and that acts for that purpose should be 
construed strictly.”) (emphasis added); Weathers ex rel. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. 
Cauthen, 12 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 1943) (holding that statutes in derogation of common law 
must be strictly construed). 
 126. 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003). 
 127. Id. at 278. 
 128. See Goldman v. Campbell, 920 So. 2d 1264, 1268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(Farmer, J., concurring specially) (noting that in Willis Shaw, “[w]ithout any explanation, the 
supreme court simply asserted” that strict construction applied to a rule of civil procedure). 
 129. Willis Shaw, 849 So. 2d at 278 (emphasis added); see also Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906 
So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 2005) (reaffirming a strict construction of Rule 1.442). 
 130. Ellen K. Lyons, Strict Construction of Civil Procedure Governing Settlement 
Proposals, TRIAL LAWYERS SECTION OF THE HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION LAWYER 
52 (2007), available at http://www.carltonfields.com/files/Publication/94db32e3-73bd-427f-aed0-342 
3d5262da2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e4f77368-98b6-4b9a-ad18-376e650a315a/Strict%20 
Construction%20of%20Civil%20Procedure%20Governing%20Settlement%20Proposals.pdf. 
 131. See Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1992) (stating that Rule 1.442 “can only 
control procedural matters”). 
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the common law, it should be declared unconstitutional.
132
  
C.  Penal Nature as Grounds for an Exception 
Just as the Florida Supreme Court’s original basis for strict 
construction of attorney’s fees statutes did not contemplate application 
to rules of civil procedure, “[t]he court’s reasoning had nothing to do 
with the idea that statutes for attorneys fees are penal in nature.”133 The 
shifting of attorney’s fees upon the satisfaction of various criteria is no 
more penal in nature “than other consequences experienced routinely 
and frequently in ordinary litigation.”134 Therefore, it is seemingly 
inconsistent to require strict construction for Rule 1.442, but to leave 
just and speedy construction for all of the other rules of civil 
procedure.
135
  
However, there is a noteworthy counterargument that the proposals 
for settlement provisions are penal in nature. Specifically, one can argue 
that “section 768.79 imposes a penalty for unreasonably rejecting a 
settlement offer.”136 Thus, proposals for settlement create disincentives 
to litigate by “applying pressure and creating risks for an opposing 
party.”137 Counter to the American Rule, the shifting of attorney’s fees 
becomes a punishment for a party who fails to correctly predict a jury’s 
decision. Under this view that strict construction should apply to 
                                                                                                                     
 132. See infra Part IV. See generally Lyons, supra note 130, at 52 (explaining rules of civil 
procedure should not create substantive rights in derogation of any law); Martin H. Redish, 
Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the Foundations of Modern Procedure, 
64 FLA. L. REV. 845, 855 (2012) (articulating that a “delicate balance between substance and 
procedure . . . is central to the smooth functioning of a constitutional democracy”). 
 133. Hauss v. Waxman, 914 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (Farmer, J., 
concurring specially). 
 134. Id. at 478. Judge Gary Farmer went on to explain that: 
Every time the court enters a money judgment, an injunction or a decree, every 
time it imposes costs, fees and interest, it vindicates the judgment with the 
coercive force of final process. As a matter of routine coercion of law’s 
decisions, individuals can have their property taken in a levy of execution, they 
can be held in contempt, they can be made to pay a fine, and they can even be 
incarcerated. All of this is surely penal in the sense that Willis Shaw uses the 
term. 
Id. 
 135. See Lyons, supra note 130, at 52 (noting the same inconsistency is pronounced in the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Goldman, 32 Fla. L. Weekly S320 (June 14, 
2007)). 
 136. Hilyer Sod, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Exp., Inc., 817 So. 2d 1050, 1054 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
 137. Ellen Koehler Lyons, Understanding Proposals for Settlement 8 (Client Article 
published by Carlton Fields, 2006), available at http://www.carltonfields.com/elyons/?op= 
publications. 
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proposal for settlement provisions due to their penal nature, a legislative 
solution to the recent demise of joint proposals would be most effective. 
Arguably, the legislature would be in the best position to guide the 
court’s application of strict construction by amending Florida Statutes 
section 768.79 to specifically address joint proposals.  
However, even if strict construction should apply to this one specific 
procedural rule, Florida courts’ current reading of Rule 1.442 seems 
inconsistent with the application of a rigid interpretative standard. Judge 
Gary Farmer of the Fourth District Court of Appeal made this clear as 
he expressed his hope that the Florida Supreme Court “will reconsider 
its policy of strict construction of procedural rules like rule 1.442 and 
make clear that strict construction of attorneys fees statutes means only 
that judges have no power of interpretation to extend such statutes 
beyond their stated terms and nothing else.”138 Imposing a requirement 
that proposals for settlement cannot be conditioned upon mutual 
acceptance is seemingly beyond the bounds of strict construction 
because such a requirement expands both the statute and the court rule 
beyond their stated terms.  
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF POWERS IMPLICATIONS 
Not only does the Florida Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of a 
rule of civil procedure stand in stark contrast to the court’s own 
interpretive principles, it also blurs the distinction between substantive 
law and procedural rule. “[B]ecause courts frequently must address 
difficult questions of statutory construction in the context of a specific 
fact situation involving a live controversy between or among litigants, 
in the course of that effort, courts sometimes lose sight of the 
implications of their decision for interbranch relations.”139 Thus, recent 
decisions such as Gorka may raise constitutional separation of powers 
concerns inadvertently created by the court.  
As discussed in Part I of this Note, statutes and court rules serve 
different functions and stem from the authority of different 
governmental branches.
140
 “Article V, section 2(a), of the Florida 
Constitution provides [the Florida Supreme Court] with exclusive 
authority to adopt rules for practice and procedure in the courts of this 
State. The Legislature, on the other hand, is entrusted with the task of 
enacting substantive law.”141 When provisions combine substantive and 
procedural aspects, the judiciary and the legislature must work together 
                                                                                                                     
 138. Goldman v. Campbell, 920 So. 2d 1264, 1274 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (Farmer, 
J., concurring specially). 
 139. Peter D. Webster et al., Statutory Construction in Florida: In Search of a Principled 
Approach, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 435, 521 (2008). 
 140. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 141. TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995). 
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to ensure that neither branch encroaches on the other’s constitutional 
powers.
142
 
 The Florida Supreme Court has previously noted that “the area of 
attorney fees and sanctions in the offer of judgment process may well be 
substantive.”143 At the very least, it is clear that “the circumstances 
under which a party is entitled to costs and attorney’s fees is substantive 
and [the Florida Supreme Court’s] rule can only control procedural 
matters.”144 Florida Statutes section 768.79 establishes a “mandatory 
right to attorney’s fees, if the statutory prerequisites have been met.”145 
This mandatory right is substantive in nature.
146
 Essentially, Florida 
Statutes section 768.79 “begins by creating an ‘entitlement’ to fees.”147 
A party “shall be entitled” to attorney’s fees and court costs if two 
perquisites are met: (1) the party serves a proposal for settlement that is 
rejected or not accepted within thirty days, and (2) the offering party has 
recovered a judgment that is at least 25% greater than or less than the 
proposal for settlement.
148
 “No other factor is relevant in determining 
the question of entitlement.”149 
“That entitlement may then lead to an ‘award’ of fees. That award 
may then be lost by a finding that the entitlement was created ‘not in 
good faith,’ or the amount of the award may be adjusted upward or 
downward by a consideration of statutory factors.”150 “When the 
Legislature enacted section 768.79, it [made] a policy determination that 
attorney’s fees should be recoverable under certain circumstances.”151 
Therefore, the legislature designed the statute such that a court must 
find a party is entitled to attorney’s fees when the statutory prerequisites 
are met,
152
 unless the court determines the proposal was not made in 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See id. at 611; Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1992).  
 143. Leapai, 595 So. 2d at 15; see also Fla. Bar Re: Amendment to Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 550 So. 2d 442, 442 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that “it is not so clear that a sanction is 
‘procedural’ when it imposes a ‘fine’ based on a percentage of an unaccepted offer, especially 
when a party may have done nothing more serious than guessing wrong about a jury verdict”). 
 144. Timmons v. Comb, 608 So. 2d 1, 2–3 (Fla. 1992). 
 145. Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 146. TGI Friday’s, Inc., 663 So. 2d at 611 (noting that the legislature “has created a 
substantive right to attorney’s fees in section 768.79 on the occurrence of certain specified 
conditions”). 
 147. Schmidt, 629 So. 2d at 1040. 
 148. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(1) (2012). 
 149. Schmidt, 629 So. 2d at 1040.  
 150. Id. 
 151. BDO Seidman, LLP v. British Car Auctions, Inc., 802 So. 2d 366, 368 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2001). 
 152. See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(1) (stating that a party “shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable costs and attorney’s fees” when the statutory prerequisites are satisfied); id. 
§ 768.79(2) (listing the four prerequisites of a valid offer).  
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good faith.
153
  
In light of the Gorka decision, it is worth questioning whether a 
substantive right to attorney’s fees serves any purpose if it cannot be 
enforced.
154
 “Under the statute, the legislature intended to encourage 
settlements and reduce litigation costs on society by providing that 
prevailing parties who make a legitimate offer of judgment will have a 
reasonable expectation of recovering their attorney’s fees”;155 however, 
the Florida courts have frustrated this purpose by making settlement 
more difficult to accomplish.
156
 By adding a requirement that the 
legislature did not deem relevant in determining entitlement
157
 and 
effectively rendering joint proposals for settlement useless,
158
 the 
Florida Supreme Court has arguably infringed on the legislature’s 
purview to create substantive law.
159
  
This same separation of powers concern was raised in Heymann v. 
Free.
160
 In Heymann, the First District Court of Appeal was constrained 
by Lamb v. Matetzschk
161
 and the language of Rule 1.442(c)(3)
162
 to 
invalidate a joint proposal for settlement that failed to apportion the 
offer.
163
 Although the court in Heymann was confronted with the 
judicially created requirement that joint proposals be apportioned, the 
same concerns presented by the court could apply to the judicially 
created prohibition against joint proposals conditioned on mutual 
                                                                                                                     
 153. See id. § 768.79(7)(a) 
 154. See Schantz v. Sekine, 60 So. 3d 444, 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Thomas, J., 
specially concurring) (“This substantive right is meaningless, however, if it cannot be 
enforced”). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646, 654 (Fla. 2010) (Polston, 
J., dissenting) (“[The Gorka decision] effectively eliminates the ability to make joint offers. In 
many instances, a party is motivated to settle an entire case with all parties because the litigation 
is expensive, distracting, and unpleasant. But if the case is going to continue, then there may be 
little incentive to partially settle.”). 
 157. Id. at 652 (stating that “[t]here is no prohibition against offers to multiple parties 
conditioned on joint acceptance within . . . section 768.79, Florida Statutes”). 
 158. Id. at 654 (urging that Gorka “effectively eliminates the ability to make joint offers”); 
Schantz, 60 So. 3d at 446 (agreeing with Justice Polston’s dissent in Gorka). 
 159. See Benyard v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1975) (“Substantive law 
prescribes the duties and rights under our system of government. The responsibility to make 
substantive law is in the legislature within the limits of the state and federal constitutions.”). See 
generally Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class 
Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 644 (2010) (emphasizing 
that “[a]s a matter of . . . constitutional separation of powers . . . a court may not employ a rule 
of procedure to alter the essence of the underlying substantive right being enforced”). 
 160. 913 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 161. 906 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2005). 
 162. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3) requires in relevant part that “[a] joint 
proposal shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party.” FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442(c)(3). 
 163. Heymann, 913 So. 2d at 12.  
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acceptance. The Heymann court cautioned: 
In our view, the result in this case implicates the separation 
of powers clause in Article II, Section 3 of the Florida 
Constitution. Such a result will deprive [the offerors of the 
proposal for settlement] of a significant attorney’s fee 
award based on a requirement of rule 1.442 that is not 
contained in section 768.79, Florida Statutes.
164
 
The court also noted that a “rule of procedure cannot alter, amend or 
eliminate an entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees authorized in 
Section 768.79, Florida Statutes.”165 The court’s concern for separation 
of powers implications seems even more pronounced if applied to a 
judicially created requirement that is neither in the plain language of the 
statute or the court rule. In Gorka, the court relied on Lamb to read into 
Rule 1.442 a new requirement—the right of independent control for 
offerees
166—that likely alters, amends, or eliminates an offeror’s 
entitlement to fees under Florida Statutes section 768.79. Thus, the 
same separation of powers concern articulated in Heymann also arises 
in Gorka. 
It is important to note that an opposing separation of powers concern 
may be raised: Perhaps, the legislature has infringed on the judiciary by 
enacting procedural mechanisms through Florida Statutes section 
768.79. The Florida Supreme Court has stated that “where a statute does 
not basically convey substantive rights, the procedural aspects of the 
statute cannot be deemed ‘incidental,’ and that statute is 
unconstitutional.”167 However, Florida Statutes section 768.79 expressly 
establishes a substantive right to attorney’s fees168 and therefore does 
not fall into this category. It is also clear that Florida Statutes section 
768.79 does not fall into the purely substantive category
169
 as it 
establishes procedural time frames for acceptance of proposals.
170
 Thus, 
Florida Statutes section 768.79 does not fit exclusively into either a 
procedural or substantive category. The court has stated “where a statute 
                                                                                                                     
 164. Id.  
 165. Id.; see also In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So. 2d 105, 
106 (Fla. 1996) (rejecting a proposed amendment to Rule 1.442 which would enable courts to 
determine “the entitlement to” fees because the legislature has made this determination as matter 
of substantive law). 
 166. See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text. 
 167. Massey v. David, 979 So. 2d 931, 937 (Fla. 2008). 
 168. See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(1) (2012). 
 169. See Massey, 979 So. 2d at 937 (stating that “[i]f a statute is clearly substantive and 
‘operates in an area of legitimate legislative concern,’ [the Florida Supreme Court] will not hold 
that it constitutes an unconstitutional encroachment on the judicial branch).  
 170. See FLA. STAT. § 768.79(4) (stating that a party has thirty days to accept a proposal 
for settlement from the time the proposal is filed). 
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contains some procedural aspects, but those provisions are so intimately 
intertwined with the substantive rights created by the statute, that statute 
will not impermissibly intrude on the practice and procedure of the 
courts in a constitutional sense.”171 Therefore, a separation of powers 
argument that the legislature is unconstitutionally infringing on the 
judiciary through the procedural aspects of Florida Statutes section 
768.79 will likely fail.  
In Timmons v. Combs,
172
 the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged 
that the proposal for settlement statute has procedural elements,
173
 but 
the court did not invalidate the statute nor address any constitutional 
separation of powers concerns. Rather, the court repealed its own rule of 
civil procedure and adopted the procedural aspects of the statute into the 
amended Rule 1.442.
174
 Thus, even if the prohibition against joint 
proposals conditioned on mutual acceptance were entirely procedural in 
nature, the Florida Supreme Court may have ceded its procedural 
authority to the legislature in the proposals for settlement context.  
An alternative reading is that Timmons implies that authorizing joint 
proposals for settlement is substantive in nature, and should therefore be 
explicitly authorized by the legislature. On this view, separation of 
powers concerns would be most effectively addressed by the legislature 
clearly defining the rights and responsibilities of parties in the realm of 
joint proposals for settlement. Ultimately, however, the most pragmatic 
solution to these separation of powers concerns is for the court to strive 
to effectuate the legislative intent behind Florida Statutes section 
768.79. In doing so, the court will be more inclined to interpret 
Rule 1.442 in such a manner as to avoid altering, amending, or 
eliminating any entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees which the 
legislature did not prohibit as a means of encouraging settlement. One 
way to begin this process is to look to the proposal for settlement 
provisions and interpretative principles of other states.   
IV.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEVADA’S PROPOSAL FOR 
SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS 
Nevada is a forerunner in implementing statutory and procedural 
provisions that further the goal of proposals for settlement (or “offers of 
judgment,” as they are referred to in Nevada)—encouraging settlement. 
Nevada Revised Statutes section 17.115 and Nevada Rule of Civil 
                                                                                                                     
 171. Massey, 979 So. 2d at 937. 
 172. 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992) 
 173. See Timmons, 608 So. 2d 1 at 3 (explaining that Florida Statutes section 768.79 “does 
contain procedural aspects which are subject to [the Florida Supreme Court’s] rule-making 
authority”). 
 174. See id. (stating that the Florida Supreme Court “hereby adopt[s] the procedural portion 
of section 768.79 as a rule of this Court effective as of the date of this opinion”). 
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Procedure 68 set forth Nevada’s offer of judgment protocols and must 
be read alongside one another.
175
 Despite minor differences between the 
language of the statute and the court rule, “[a]s a general matter, [the 
Nevada Supreme Court] construes the rules in harmony with the 
statute.”176  
Similar to Florida Statutes section 768.79, Nevada Revised Statutes 
section 17.115 is also a two-way fee-shifting provision.
177
 The most 
notable difference between the two statutes is that Nevada Revised 
Statutes section 17.115 specifically addresses joint offers of judgment: 
(6) Multiple parties may make a joint offer of judgment 
pursuant to this section. 
(7) A party may make to two or more other parties pursuant 
to this section an apportioned offer of judgment that is 
conditioned upon acceptance by all the parties to whom the 
apportioned offer is made. Each party to whom such an 
offer is made may serve upon the party who made the offer 
a separate written notice of acceptance of the offer.
178
 
Under the Nevada offer of judgment statute, an offeror may 
condition an offer on the joint acceptance of the offerees.
179
 If at least 
one offeree does not accept the offer, then “[t]he action must proceed as 
to all parties to whom the apportioned offer was made, whether or not 
the other parties accepted or rejected the offer.”180 However, only those 
offerees who rejected the offer will be subject to the fee-shifting 
provisions of the statute.
181
 Offerees who accepted the offer are not 
subject to these fee-shifting provisions, even if they fail to obtain a more 
favorable judgment at trial.
182
 Ultimately, the statute exists to encourage 
settlement: “[t]he purpose of section 17.115 is to place the risk of loss 
on the offeree who fails to accept the offer, thus encouraging both offers 
and acceptance of offers.”183 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 175. See McCrary v. Bianco, 131 P.3d 573, 576 (Nev. 2006). 
 176. Id. 
 177. However, unlike Florida Statutes section 768.79 which requires at least a 25% 
differential between the rejected offer and the judgment at trial, Nevada Revised Statutes section 
17.115 simply provides for fee-shifting when a “party who rejects an offer of judgment fails to 
obtain a more favorable judgment.” NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.115(4) (West 2011). 
 178. Id. § 17.115(6)–(7); see also NEV. R. CIV. P. 68(c) (addressing joint proposals). 
 179. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.115(7). 
 180. Id. § 17.115(7)(a). 
 181. See id. § 17.115(7)(b)(1). 
 182. See id. § 17.115(7)(b)(2). 
 183. Trs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Union Local 525 Health & Welfare Trust Plan v. 
Developers Sur. & Indem. Co., 84 P.3d 59, 62 (Nev. 2004). 
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The Nevada offer of judgment court rule also exists “to encourage 
settlement of lawsuits before trial.”184 Nevada’s Rule 68 is notable in 
that it “introduced a tremendous degree of flexibility to parties that 
choose to serve offers of judgment. This high degree of flexibility is 
unique to Nevada . . . .”185 Rather than requiring an unyielding and rigid 
construction of the procedural rule, the Nevada Supreme Court reads 
Rule 68 alongside the offer of judgment statute “such that no part of the 
statute is turned to mere surplusage.”186 Thus, Rule 68 fulfills its 
purpose by properly administering the substantive law. Further, the 
court’s practical interpretation of Rule 68 furthers legislative intent and 
recognizes that “[t]he offer of judgment is a useful settlement device 
which should be made available at every possible juncture where the 
rules allow.”187 
Although Nevada’s offer of judgment provisions are something of an 
outlier, Nevada’s approach can be looked to as a model for judicial and 
legislative cooperation in effectuating the true intent of offer of 
judgment provisions. The Nevada Supreme Court’s pragmatic 
construction of its procedural rule can provide instruction. Further, the 
language of Nevada’s provisions embodies the interpretation advocated 
by the Gorka dissent, and “[t]o interpret these provisions any other way 
effectively eliminates the ability to make joint offers.”188 Nevada’s 
flexible approach to offers of judgment maximizes the utility of joint 
offers by recognizing that “if it would be futile to remove only some of 
the parties from the litigation, it makes sense to require all parties to 
accept the offer of judgment.”189 Thus, Nevada’s provisions promote the 
early resolution of litigation by eliminating the risks of piecemeal 
settlement that exist under Florida’s provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the good intentions of the Florida Legislature and the Florida 
Supreme Court, proposals for settlement continue to generate more 
litigation rather than settlement. In order to better effectuate the 
intended purpose of Florida Statutes section 768.79 and Florida Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1.442, courts should uniformly apply the “just and 
speedy” interpretive standard set forth in Rule 1.010. A pragmatic 
                                                                                                                     
 184. Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 860 P.2d 720, 724 (Nev. 1993). 
 185. Craig Roecks, A Proposal to Clarify Rule 68 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 
Regarding Offers of Judgment, 7 NEV. L.J. 382, 382 (2007). 
 186. Albios v. Horizon Comtys., Inc., 132 P.3d 1022, 1031 (Nev. 2006). 
 187. Allianz, 860 P.2d at 724. 
 188. See Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646, 654 (Fla. 2010) (Polston, 
J., dissenting). 
 189. See Micah S. Echols & Erik W. Fox, Offers of Judgment in Nevada: Best Friend or 
Worst Enemy?, 2010 NEV. LAW. 25, 26 (2010). 
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construction of Rule 1.442 will further opportunities for settlement 
rather than hinder them, better enabling the procedural rule to enact the 
substantive law.  
Although the Florida Supreme Court labels its current interpretation 
of Rule 1.442 “strict construction,”190 the distinctions between strict and 
liberal construction have been blurred by decisions like Gorka. Instead 
of striving to adhere to the often confusing and ill-suited strict 
construction standard, the court should strive to promote justice and 
interpret Rule 1.442 correctly by giving it its intended meaning.
191
 By 
shifting the court’s focus to the purpose of the proposal for settlement 
provisions, constitutional separation of powers concerns will likely be 
eliminated as the court will be less inclined to expand the provisions 
beyond their stated terms.  
The Florida Legislature can aid the court by “clarifying parties’ 
rights and responsibilities in making and receiving offers of 
judgments.”192 Like Nevada’s statute, Florida Statutes section 768.79 
should specifically address joint proposals for settlement. The 
legislature should make clear whether enforceability is determined by 
apportionment, by the ability of each offeree to act independently, or 
whether neither of those considerations is important.
193
 However, even 
if the legislature does not offer such clarification, the Florida Supreme 
Court, much like the Nevada Supreme Court, should make joint 
proposals for settlement available at every junction the statute does not 
prohibit. The court has the power to revive joint proposals as useful 
tools for settlement by adhering to its own interpretive principle that 
procedural rules are to be construed for the equitable and just 
application of the substantive law. Thus, the court can “repave” the road 
toward settlement by returning to, and effectuating, the purpose behind 
Florida’s proposal for settlement provisions.   
                                                                                                                     
 190. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Hauss v. Waxman, 914 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 192. Schantz v. Sekine, 60 So. 3d 444, 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Thomas, J., 
specially concurring).  
 193. See Barbara Busharis, One Offer, Indivisible? Florida Courts Continue to Clarify the 
Limits of Joint Settlement Proposals, 30 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 4, 5 (2011). 
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